Internet service providers (ISPs) have played an important role in the Internet regulation regime of China. This article illustrates how ISPs are governed to serve the government's regulatory goals. The task of explanation involves examining some of the most extraordinary and profound insights concerning the Internet governance, that is, the theories of Layers Principle, the End-toend Argument and the Generative Internet. Chinese ISPs have been the dependent rather than neutral regulatory intermediaries of the government. Moreover, in addition to telecommunication carriers, the radio and TV networks affiliated to the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) are to become a new type of ISP that is capable of choking free spirit of the Internet as recently demonstrated by the far-reaching policy of "network convergence." This article argues that the policy has a great potential to drastically alter the structure and ecology of the Internet in China.
INTRODUCTION
Internet service providers (ISPs) have played an important role in China's Internet regulation regime. They can be roughly divided into two categories based on business scale: backbone ISPs and lastmile ISPs. Backbone ISPs own independent gateways connected to the international Internet and outsource the last-mile access business to last-mile ISPs. At present, China has seven major backbone ISPs, running three commercial networks-China Telecom, China Unicom and China Mobile, and four public service networks-CSTNET, CERNET, CIETNET and CGWNET. In this article, I will illustrate how these two kinds of ISP are governed to serve the government's regulatory goals. Drawing the contours of ISPs' daily operations is far from enough to fully understand the intent and logic of Internet regulation by means of ISPs. The task of explanation involves some of the most extraordinary and profound insights concerning Internet governance, that is, the theories of Layers Principle, the End-to-end Argument and the Generative Internet, which to a certain extent justify the regulations in favor of net neutrality. Although these theories have not been applied in any literature to Chinese Internet, I believe they will prove to be powerful tools and useful perspectives to cast a light on the status quo of Chinese Internet regulation. Chinese ISPs have been the dependent rather than neutral regulatory intermediaries of the government. Their political actions and commercial behaviors can compromise the function of
Internet as an open and innovative platform for culture production, free expression and creative industry.
Moreover, in addition to telecommunication carriers, the radio and TV networks affiliated to the State Administration for Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) are to become a new type of ISP that is capable of choking the free spirit of Internet as recently demonstrated by the far-reaching policy of "networks convergence". The latent effects of this policy remain ignored by the academia. This article argues that the policy has a great potential to drastically alter the structure and ecology of Internet in China.
This article proceeds as follows. Firstly I will summarize the legal obligations and daily operations of ISPs in Part II, with an emphasis on the mechanisms of the Great Firewall. Parts III and IV start with the theories of Layers Principle, the End-to-end Argument and the Generative Internet, and then proceed with two cases of VoIP and P2P in Chinese context. Based on all these, in Part V, I take the allowed to visit and what information to obtain. In practice, more and more people are aware of the GFW and bothered by it, although some of them cannot distinguish governmental manipulation at the back-end from pure technical mistakes. However, only a small number have the incentive to browse "across the wall."
3 For these tech savvies, it is fairly convenient to circumvent the GFW with free proxies or software that are readily available on the Internet; 4 For those who are politically insensitive, they can live quite well with business and entertainment contents provided by domestic sites.
The primary goal of GFW is to block free flow of information and facilitate the formation of a "local net" or "intranet". 5 Compared to telephone and telegraph, the Internet is unique in that its operation relies on the physical facilities and technological code. 6 By blocking and filtering at the international gateway at national level, the Chinese government has created one basically "clean" virtual sphere in its own hands. Even if a Chinese netizen gets around the GFW, it is unlikely for him to spread any blacklisted information domestically on a large scale due to the inspection of last-mile ISPs at local level.
B. ISP Censorship at Local Level
While the GFW is directly managed by the central government, domestic practice of Internet censorship lies with local government. Several laws have ruled that ISPs shall be held responsible for the information security within their own networks, including keeping the original records of user behaviors and reporting to the police on time, the same obligations as those of the websites. 7 These obligations elevated the level of self-censorship by ISPs. As in the case of the GFW, local last-mile ISPs apply a blacklist of key words and websites prescribed by local governments to routers or main nodes covering one or more administrative jurisdictions. Since local blacklists substantially vary, the self-censorship 3 It is analyzed that many netizens were more fond of browsing the overseas news republished by others rather than go across the GFW themselves. It is especially noteworthy that all Chinese content regulators tend to secure an absolute control from the pipes to end devices without any check and balance, either vertically or horizontally. As I will demonstrate later, China's regulatory approaches to the virtual world are essentially the same as in the case of its traditional governance of the real world. Before we elaborate this point, which is crucial to our understanding of Chinese Internet regulation, it is necessary to introduce several basic theories of Internet governance.
III. END-TO-END ARGUMENT, LAYERS PRINCIPLE AND THE GENERATIVE INTERNET
The Internet can be viewed both as inter-connected computers and as a set of technological layers.
Three decades ago, the basic principles of Internet's structure were initiated to better serve people in constructing future networks. One of the principles was "End-to-end," proposed by three MIT computer scientists in 1984.
12 End-to-end refers to such system device, in which "the function in question can completely and correctly be implemented only with the knowledge and help of the application standing at the end points of the communication system." That means the conduits within an ideal system design should solely focus on data transmission, leaving data correction and main functions of the system to end devices. Similarly, in an ideal computer network, the pipes and cables transmitting data should not interfere with the function of end applications. All they need to do is to ensure the correctness and security of information transmission. The End-to-end principle ensured the flourish of Internet during the early age of its development, because all innovations can be experimented at the edge of the Internet without any interfere from the central.
Another was the Layers Principle, which claims that the Internet can be divided into several layers. Each layer should have its own special function and it is inefficient and problematic to interfere into one layer for sake of another. 13 There are usually three layers: the content layer, the logic layer and the physical layer, which form an hourglass model of the Internet. 14 The content and physical layer should develop respectively, while the logic layer such as TCP/IP protocol should be kept simple to facilitate data transmission. In this ideal structure, the numerous end users are encouraged to innovate and produce various contents through personal computer (PC) and operation system (OS) at the periphery of the Internet, without worrying about being prohibited or blocked. Eventually a generative Internet will come into being, creating more and more prosperous economies and cultures in cyberspace. 15 From the viewpoint of freedom of speech, the Internet should not be controlled by ISPs as a common carrier for telecommunication. People are entitled to the freedom of expression even on the privately owned information networks, because these networks usually functions as part of the national infrastructure. 16 Despite of the security problems caused spontaneously by the same structure such as virus and cyberattack, the better solution should be to launch reforms at the end device rather than the middle. Neutrality proposed legislation to make sure the Internet was neutrally and non-discriminately managed.
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Besides the Constitutional justification, the debate mainly focused on economic efficiency. Those who favored Net Neutrality argued that the discrimination on the part of broadband ISPs would destroy an open platform for mass innovation. 20 They urged the government to regulate cable ISPs to the extent of providing a basic protection for end innovation. On the contrary, the opponents upheld a solution of vertical integration of conduits and end-devices, which was in favor of innovation by last-mile ISPs as opposed to innovation by end users. As long as the market of Internet access is competitive, they argued, both innovation and efficiency could be fulfilled by vertical integration. 21 As a matter of fact, both sides acknowledged that competition was necessary for a flourishing Internet. The fundamental difference between the two sides of arguments is how to handle the relationship between upstream and downstream markets, e.g., innovation by end users or ISPs.
IV. NET NEUTRALITY IN CHINESE CONTEXT
The policy implications of the aforementioned theories include, the telecommunication carriers It is commonly believed that basic service providers (access business) should be entrusted with more responsibilities than value-added service providers (information business), for example, the former are obliged to ensure fair access and nondiscrimination while the latter do not have such obligation. The
Chinese Telecommunications Regulation of 2000 also divides telecommunication business into basic and value-added service, but does not impose distinctive duties on service providers accordingly. What's more, the state-owned broadband ISPs are free to provide both basic and value-added service, which always brings monopoly in both upstream and downstream markets. If there is any value-added ICP having conflicting interests with them, they could discriminate any content and end-application at their discretion. It is also impossible for the lawyers to reason based on the division between broadband provider and dial-up provider as in the U.S. laws. 30 The flaws of Telecommunications Regulation provide excuse for illegal behaviors such as P2P blocking to take place once and again. The latest proposed
Telecommunications Law still does not make the distinction to solve that problem. 31 The future practice is still unclear.
V. RETURN TO THE REGULATING MODEL: THE CASE OF THE SARFT
A.
Model of Perfect Control
We Take license for example. Every special content regulator tried to licensed online professional information such as news, publication, videos and games. Through such action, the government can raise the market entry threshold and meanwhile facilitate the daily supervision and management of these content industries.
Once the amount of players is limited, the government can maintain the absolute influence. As for the scattered information and personal sites outside their realms, they can rely on the unneutral ISPs for help.
The easiest way to regulate these chaotic sites is to shut down the sensitive and uncooperative ones for a period of time, especially during the important days such as Birthday of CCP and National Day, which has become a natural political custom of local governments.
However, these means are far from enough for special content agencies, with the conduit in the hands of an independent agency (i.e. MII). In order to supervise online information and behaviors, the regulators not only need a set of executive staff, but have to control the whole information system as much as possible. Each execution of power has to do with the platform, infrastructure, standard, market and information, namely, all layers of the Internet. Because the information of regulatory objects can be collected through network platform, it is natural for the regulators to establish their own management system.
What's more, cooperation between different agencies usually involved high transaction costs such as refusing to cooperate. That's why the central government launched the comprehensive movements one after another. If the Internet did not exist, or the amount of the websites was growing slowly, or all websites were clearly classified by contents and licensed by different regulators, the business of regulation would have been much easier and more efficient. However, the convergence nature of new media makes it quite difficult to control online information in a traditional way, if not impossible. But the regulators' partial interests make them reluctant to deregulate. Thus the establishment of independent information system is the best choice to solve the cooperation problem.
Therefore, in the digital age, if the points of information flow are controlled in the same hand, the situation so formed is called vertical integration, the same strategy applied by the ISPs. Through this kind of administrative vertical integration, regulator can supervise the information flow at any point. It is obvious that such idea emerged in the minds of Chinese leaders of different agencies. The most ideal situation is to control a vertical closed system, which not only brings huge profits from the monopoly industries and prevents intervening from other agencies, but enables them to enhance the information security protection and construction of content industry. They will own the power to set rules on industry standard, management platform, market entrance, regulatory object's information and service through end product. Once the state power is combined with commercial interests without any check and balance, the corruption can easily occur. Worse, the whole market of idea, free expression and creative commons would be intervened and censored through the infrastructural control. Unfortunately, China is undergoing such a process and moving fast towards an uncertain future. We can find such an evolutionary trajectory clearly in the developing process of radio, movie and TV industry. The practices of the SARFT have exemplified perfectly the policy of vertical integration over the Internet.
B. The Problem of the SARFT
The SARFT is a special content regulator which used to control a considerable proportion of people's spiritual products in the history of People's Republic of China. Such control is mainly achieved by tight censorship and active propaganda. The other challenge comes from the ISPs and the MII. In the late 1990s, many ISPs saw the great profit of IPTV, a kind of innovative business that combines TV broadcasting and other interactive services on a uniform platform, which is more convenient for the audience than traditional one-way TV broadcasting. The telecommunication carriers began to build digital video platform and provide radio and TV services on the Internet through P2P technology before any relevant regulation came out. Besides great profit, another reason to invest in IPTV is that the nascent online content market was small. The
ISPs were seeking new business opportunity in order to attract more users. Nothing could be more attractive than IPTV, while such business of course infringed the monopoly interests of the SARFT.
To be sure, the ownership of the communication network plays a vital role in the regulatory games in China. It has been well established that the ownership of the mass media weighs much in content selection and the formation of public opinion. The ownership can even affect the values of freedom of speech and democracy. 34 The problem remains the same in the digital age. Although the ordinary people are empowered with the ability to challenge the large incumbents, the latter still has the power to dominate the public discourse by means of vertical integration of mass media. In the United
States, the danger of convergence of three layers of the Internet has been recognized and alerted, but it is difficult to advance the net neutrality principle immediately. 35 In China, the ownership also matters, only performing in different forms. As is known, like telephone line, radio and TV station, and satellite antenna, telecommunication infrastructure has been state-owned asset from the scratch for the reason of information security and monopoly interest. At the national level, backbone ISPs are supervised by the MII, while the last-mile ISPs are under supervision of local authorities. Because the MII is not responsible for any content regulation and is mainly in charge of technological and business issues, it lacks incentives to regulate the end users unless their behaviors threaten their economic interests.
However, different from the MII, agencies such as the SARFT resume three-fold tasks: to promote the socialist culture, to make profit through the RTN and to defeat the harmful information and contents. It has to control the RTN from the conduit to end device for its own sake. If the network was taken away from its hand to a more "neutral" agency like the MII, it will lose quite a lot of profit and power. That's why the SARFT has always been opposing any proposal that attempts to let the MII take over the RTN, although the latter could make it more efficient and profitable.
During the telecommunication reform of 1998, the proposal of "convergence of three networks" launched through its 3G plan in 2009. But the reform in radio and TV system has fallen behind because of the large bureaucracy and its disadvantageous technology.
C. The History of Conflict between SARFT and MII
The conflict between the SARFT and the MII took place at the end of 1990s. As the ISPs were taking advantage of IPTV, the SARFT was irritated and refused to cooperate with the ISPs. Very soon such behavior of providing IPTV service was prohibited by a joint regulatory document issued by the SARFT and the MII. In fact, when the MII was newly established in 1998, several power of the SARFT were decided to be shifted to the hands of the MII, especially the power of planning, managing and technological standard setting of the TV network (both wire and wireless). 36 But the SARFT decided to ignore these arrangements and still held the relevant power until present day. Later in October 1999, the SARFT issued another notice confirming that "any radio, movie and TV program transmitted through various information networks (including the Internet) within the national territory must be submitted to the SARFT for approval."
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In reality, the practices of all kinds of IPTV could not be banned thoroughly because the users preferred it to the traditional TV set both in its broadcasting speed and high quality. The local governments also supported such creative business for the sake of huge profit. 38 As the ISPs began to upgrade the telecommunication networks to broadband conduits, the business of IPTV was even more welcomed. The SARFT had no choice but to build robust digital networks by itself to compete with the ISPs. On one hand, under the shelter of content security, the SARFT tried hard to develop digital TV (DTV) networks to replace IPTV in spite of a series of difficulties such as money, the uniform digital technology standard, and the cooperation from local agencies. 39 On other hand, it issued several regulations on video sites to restrict the online program through direct license, thus indirectly restricting the program providers from supplying IPTV providers with high-quality video programs. Obviously, DTV is less competitive than IPTV, because the latter has much more users than the former. 40 The SARFT has strictly controlled the creation, aggregation and broadcasting of video programs, especially the barrier for foreign capitals. When Rupert Murdoch's effort of entering China was about to succeed after ten years' struggling around 2004, the new ideological policy of Hu Jintao era changed to be hostile again. The SARFT was afraid that video online sites could become another form of TV program in case they were to cooperate with IPTV industry and circumvent the regulation. become a powerful competitor to IPTV, the survival environment for IPTV is quite hostile and disadvantage.
Traditionally, for radio and TV agencies, it is convenient and profitable to control from transmitting conduit to broadcasting end-devices to the content itself. However, several serious problems still exist for the future development of RTNs. The monopoly interests make it impossible to realize the long-term policy goal of the separation of broadcasting network and TV station; the RTNs do not have an independent International channel similar to the telecommunication carriers and are restricted from the telecommunication business by the MII; the local agencies are too scattered to form a uniform national network to enhance competitive capability of the whole industry. 43 Although the SARFT has been advancing DTV network all these years, there's no sign indicating that it would regulate the digital network in the same way the MII regulates the Internet. The SARFT was waiting for an opportunity allowing it to build a uniform digital propaganda network all over the country, namely, the proprietary information infrastructure.
D. Convergence of Networks and its Regulatory Implication
Fortunately, the attitude of the state has gradually changed from prohibiting the SARFT and the MII from running business of each other to encouraging both to use the information technology to provide digital radio and TV service. That means the state decided to pick up the convergence of networks policy to deepen the cultural industry and media reform. After this policy was written into the construction, that is, entry into each other's infrastructure. 44 Thirdly, the SARFT could gain enough funds to develop its own digital network and incorporate the scattered local RTNs, which will greatly enhance its power of supervising its subordinates. At the meantime it could maintain the power over the network under the cover of content security and will never give up the chance to develop its own technology standard. That's why it insisted that convergence of networks is not necessarily equal to one uniform network; rather, there could be several technically convergent networks supervised by different agencies.
Fourthly, the two competitors have respective strategies to embrace the technology and policy. the SARFT is developing the Next Generation Broadcasting Network in cooperation with the Ministry of 44 According to some sources, the slow speed of the SARFT to advance DTV made the state to realize that the status quo lacking competition must be changed and decide to introduce the capital from ISPs into the new industry to advance the overall transformation of DTV. See Luan Lu, "Encouraging DTV industry to develop, telecommunication and broadcasting industry enter into each other from quitting from each other," http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-02/03/content_7558403.htm. However, according to the State Council, there are obvious differences between the entitlements of SARFT and MIIT. The former is encouraged to engage in the telecom business with no limitations while the latter is encouraged to engage only in radio and TV creation and transmission businesses, which is only one aspect of radio and TV business. The power of editing and broadcasting still remains in the hand of SARFT.
cities, while the MII (now the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, MIIT) has finished the 2008 reform, ending up with three telecommunication enterprises, and issued three 3G licenses, which also helps solve the VoIP problem. It is reported that the two agencies are cooperating to discuss how to develop the cell phone TV, 45 which seems to break up the contradictions between. But it is still uncertain how to regulate the mobile TV and its content. The battle over the infrastructure has far from ending. 46 What I'm more interested in is the regulatory model by the SARFT assuming it finished its DTV plan and dominated in the network convergence business. Ideally, the original one-way transmission network would be technically upgraded into a two-way network; all TV programs would be transferred in digital forms and the end-device will be more like a PC rather than TV set. It is even proposed that an independent institution like FCC should take charge of the new media and network. 47 However, I doubt the real effects of such digital revolution in broadcasting area, because such an ideal will require the SARFT to abandon more power over the RTN. In the future, RTN might become a new type of ISP which is quite different from the present ones, probably even stricter, considering the underlying intent of the SARFT is to enhance its own power and interest in the business of propaganda. 48 It can of course provide
Internet access services to the customers combined with its rich program resources, making the IPTV industry more profitable and monopolistic. The convergence technology is only a tool to improve the transmission capacity. The SARFT could certainly refuse any institutional change that might threaten its control over the industry standard, transmitting network, end-devices and contents within the radio and TV broadcasting. It is true that it is much safer to produce a new DTV set, which can satisfy the needs of mass audience while maintaining the tight control of information. Besides, the reforms of the separation 45 between RTN and TV station, the separation between broadcasting and creation of program have all encountered many obstacles all these years. If the relevant reform in offline media industry cannot succeed, its online counterpart will probably face the same fate. It is highly possible that the future machine of DTV is not a generative PC but only an intelligence box; the future digital RTN would be an intelligent and centralized conduit rather than a generative Internet. The vertical integration of the digital network and unique end-device would empower the SARFT greatly, facilitate its regulation, restrict entry into the market and finally restrict innovation and expression over the network. That's a really perfect model of Internet regulation in China.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article stresses the crucial role of ISPs in Chinese Internet regulation. It intends to provide a fresh perspective in observing, and a powerful explanation of, the complicated and sometimes disordered regulatory practice in China. Against the background of tiao-kuai regime (vertical-horizontal division), I
draw a trajectory of cyberspace regulation. The state has tried to incorporate the Internet into the traditional administrative framework of media and press (i.e., the tiao-kuai regime, which is suitable for a vast country that is politically centralized like China), and make the technological innovation of Internet serve the country's developmental goals. However, the state has encountered unexpected difficulties in its efforts to do so, because the Internet is different from traditional offline media in its capability of information aggregation and convergence. The theories of Layers and Generative Internet have revealed the secret of maintaining control in the digital age: vertical integration, that is, the state controls not only the end-device and innovative platform, but the conduit for information flow. All relevant sectoral regulatory authorities (such as the Ministry of Culture) tempt to develop their own methods towards vertical integration. As a result, Chinese ISPs become managing tools for heavy regulation rather than neutral service providers. The debate about net neutrality in the United States focuses on striking a balance among efficiency, equality and freedom of speech. By contrast, the values of net neutrality are never considered in China's policy-making process. No efforts of separating the network from end devices and websites would be successful.
In particular, the SARFT, a content regulatory authority and propaganda agency of China, is striving to dominate the Internet vertical integration according to the network convergence policy. In the spirit of good governance and net neutrality, the SARFT is supposed to deregulate the transmission network and focus on end devices. However, the agenda of deregulation will become even more remote, if the SARFT transforms the existing radio and TV networks into a powerful digital network and becomes the first almighty content regulator of a vertically integrated system. Consequently, the radio and TV networks affiliated to the SARFT will become the largest commercial ISP in China. Confronting the double pressures from ideology security and commercialization in the digital era, the SARFT finally 
